In late 2006 U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad warned that the various Iraqi political factions might shed blood before they understand the benefits of reconciliation. Speaking in Washington recently, the top commander in Iraq U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus said, "The fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq is a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources." With the U.S. military reporting operations in Basra moving to a clear and hold phase, the future may show that as U.S. forces turn control of security over to the Iraqis, violence between rival political factions could shape the new threat environment.

In 2008 representatives from the Sadrist Movement, the party loyal to Moqtada Sadr, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council reached a formal agreement to ease their rivalry, though not much came of the move. In January Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent a proposal to the Sadrist Movement inviting it back to the central government after a long boycott. This was a good political moment for Sadr. As Maliki was busy calling the Sadrists an "essential cornerstone �� in the new Iraq," Sadr knew he could always return to the gun if the political fight stalled.

Wayne White, who led the State Department's Iraq intelligence team during 2003-2005, said a key point between the Maliki government and Sadr was his support for Maliki in 2005 for the premiership.

"Subsequently," White said, "Maliki was rather protective of Sadr, for quite some time literally needing the support of Sadr and Sadr's people in the Iraqi Council of Representatives to stay in power."

White said U.S. officials, however, pressured Maliki to distance himself from Sadr. Meanwhile, the United States also pushed Sadr's rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the SIIC, to move closer to Maliki to push Sadr out of Iraqi politics.

"At some point," White adds, "Maliki and Sadr had a falling out, mainly because of U.S. pressure on Maliki to distance himself and his government from this brash, ambitious and anti-American cleric and his violent Mahdi Army and U.S. pressure on Sadr rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim to support Maliki in order to supplant Sadr."

Hakim began to worry about the Sadrist influence in the Shiite south as most of Sadr's group fled to Basra shortly after the U.S. troop surge. Hakim saw his influence in the Maliki government as an opportunity to take more control over Basra and its key oil reserves. In March U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney met with Hakim for several hours outside of the Green Zone. Hakim emerged saying he saw eye to eye with Cheney on security issues.

The day after Cheney's visit with Hakim, a reconciliation conference in Baghdad failed from the start as Sadrist representatives stormed out of the meeting over complaints of marginalization in Parliament. The following day, March 19, under intense U.S. pressure, the three-member presidency council approved a slate of laws, including one that paved the way for October provincial elections, after Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of SIIC lifted his objection.

As Cheney left Baghdad for Washington, Maliki left for Basra to oversee security operations. Sadr loyalists at this point held many of the key positions in the south because of dissatisfaction with Hakim loyalists there. Maliki decided it was time to show the world that Iraqi security forces could lead an assault without the help of the U.S. military and took on the militias in Basra.

A June 2007 report by the International Crisis Group describes Basra as the de facto economic capital of Iraq because of its port access and oil reserves. The SIIC wanted to control Basra from Baghdad, while the Sadrists were happy to control things from the streets. Hakim was not on good terms with the Sadrists, accusing the group of assassinating SIIC governors in August 2007 and his own brother, Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, in 2003. The conflict in Basra in late March 2008 put Hakim and Maliki against Sadr, and the political arena became a bloody battle for control.

Maliki understands his government is rife with corruption and suffers from incompetence, so he sees his battle with Sadr as an opportunity to boost legitimacy in Baghdad.

"Maliki might have wanted to demonstrate that he could act on his own without (the U.S. military) in a show of strength. If so, it backfired," White said.

The conflict in Basra was largely a political move, setting the stage for the October elections. Meanwhile, Iran is seeing the unraveling of the Shiite blocs in Iraq, and with no clear winner coming out of Basra, Tehran is backing every horse in the race. Despite a variety of political conflicts underneath the surface of the Basra conflict, it is the upcoming provincial elections that dominate the Shiite row.

With Maliki limping back to Baghdad, his perception that he could emerge as an able leader dissolved. It appears he is at the mercy of Tehran and, closer to home, the SIIC and Hakim. Beyond that, both leaders must answer to Iran before they answer to the United States. The United States, meanwhile, depends on the cooperation of the SIIC and Maliki to get things done. If the Bush administration sought to contain Iran by moving into Tehran's back yard, it did so by stirring a hornet's nest.

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