Shield or Spark? The U.S. Golden Dome and the New Missile Arms Race

Shield or Spark? The U.S. Golden Dome and the New Missile Arms Race
by Scott N. Romaniuk and Laszlo Csicsmann
Budapest, Hungary (SPX) Oct 06, 2025

The launch of the US 'Golden Dome' missile defence initiative has already set in motion ripple effects across the globe. Rival nations are considering their own layered missile defence architectures, and experts warn this may trigger a new era of competitive missile development. What began as a domestic shield is now fuelling a missile defence arms race, with competitors racing to counter, replicate, or surpass America's capabilities.

The Golden Dome is more than a military project; it is a symbol of technological and strategic ambition. Its conception has prompted debates among allies and adversaries alike about the future of missile defence, space militarisation, and strategic balance. Analysts argue that the system's impact is as much political as it is technical - shaping alliances, influencing procurement programmes, and redefining deterrence strategies worldwide. These technical challenges, combined with escalating costs and the risk of intensifying international tensions, could transform what is intended as a defensive project into a source of instability. Golden Dome represents not only a defence initiative but also a statement of US strategic reach and technological dominance in space.

Technology vs. Feasibility

Extending from the ground into orbit, Golden Dome is designed to detect and intercept missile threats at the earliest stages. Using a combination of satellites, interceptors, radars, and directed-energy weapons, the system aims to create a multi-layered protective shield over the homeland.

Launched conceptually on 20 May 2025, the programme targets a broad spectrum of threats - from ballistic and hypersonic missiles to cruise missiles and drone swarms. It envisions 'all-domain interception', linking space-based sensors with ground-based interceptors, radar systems, and laser weaponry into a comprehensive defensive architecture.

Preliminary Pentagon reviews suggest that the basic design is complete, with Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing tasked with developing system components. Each of the system's four layers is designed to complement the others, creating redundancy and enhancing overall interception capability:

Space-Based Tier: Satellites for early warning and orbital interceptors to engage missiles in boost or midcourse phases.

Midcourse Layer: Long-range radars and THAAD interceptors.

High-Altitude Layer: Standard-6 missiles deployed via the Aegis combat system.

Terminal Layer: Laser weapons and next-generation interceptors.

Integration remains a formidable challenge. Coordinating multiple subsystems into a responsive 'kill-chain' is complex, and communication delays between platforms could compromise effectiveness. Orbital interceptors must also survive atmospheric re-entry while executing precise manoeuvres - capabilities not yet operationally proven.

Financial projections add further uncertainty: initial estimates placed total costs at US$175 billion, but the space-based tier alone may exceed US$500 billion. Key decisions on the number of launchers, interceptors, and supporting facilities remain unsettled, leaving the programme's final scope unclear.

Strategic Fallout

Golden Dome embodies US ambitions to sustain dominance in space and secure near-absolute protection from missile threats. Its pre-emptive approach, however, risks provoking rivals to accelerate countermeasures such as hypersonic missiles, decoys, and anti-satellite weapons. These dynamics could spur a renewed strategic competition reminiscent of Cold War escalation, effectively creating a global arms race in missile defence.

US allies, including Japan and Canada, have expressed interest in participating. Collaboration may strengthen technical capabilities and readiness, but it could also reinforce exclusive defence blocs and increase mistrust among adversaries, undermining wider strategic stability.

Spurred by rising global threats, the move follows Trump's observation of the Iron Dome in action, shielding civilians from Iran's 2024 assault. Notably, President Donald Trump recently remarked that Canada should become the 51st state of the US 'if they want to be a part of Golden Dome for free', intertwining defence cooperation with sovereignty considerations and adding complexity to diplomatic discourse.

Global Ripple Effects

Golden Dome's missile defence capabilities carry far-reaching implications for global powers and alliances. In May, Russia and China jointly called the initiative 'deeply destabilising', warning it could provoke retaliatory measures and undermine the credibility of mutually assured destruction. China's foreign ministry added that the plan has 'strong offensive implications' and called it an attempt to 'turn space into a battlefield'. Both leaders described the Golden Dome project as a rejection of the 'inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, which is one of the central and fundamental principles of maintaining global strategic stability'.

Key global responses:

China: Space-based sensors and orbital interceptors could weaken China's long-range missile deterrent. Beijing may accelerate development of anti-satellite weapons, hypersonic systems, or missile saturation tactics. SCMP reports that China is developing a 'Chinese version of the Golden Dome', based on a distributed early-warning big data platform led by Li Xudong at the Nanjing Electronic Technology Research Institute. A 'Taiwanese version' is reportedly in the works, linking Taipei's air defences into an independent missile network.

Russia: Golden Dome threatens the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear and conventional forces, particularly during midcourse and terminal phases. Moscow may respond with mobile launch platforms, advanced decoys, and hypersonic glide vehicles.

India: While not a direct target, India may be drawn into new strategic dynamics as it balances relations with China and the US, potentially strengthening missile defence or deepening cooperation with US allies. India is reportedly advancing multi-layered missile defence capabilities, which officials and analysts compare to the proposed US 'Golden Dome'. In August, India's Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, described the Sudarshan Chakra initiative as 'India's own Iron Dome or Golden Dome' during an address in Mhow. He said: 'The aim is to develop a system to protect India's strategic, civilian, and nationally important sites. It will act both as a shield as well as a sword. It will be India's own Iron Dome or Golden Dome. I am sure we will do it at an affordable cost.'

Europe and US Allies: Japan, Canada, and European states may gain protection and technical collaboration but could face pressure to align with US defence priorities. For some, the initiative signals a shift from traditional NATO deterrence, prompting adversaries to adapt their arsenals.

The Space Dilemma

Space remains a shared domain, and militarising it carries profound consequences for international security, strategic stability, and long-term access to orbital infrastructure. Deploying armed systems without internationally recognised frameworks risks eroding norms, fuelling mistrust among major powers, and increasing the likelihood of miscalculation or accidental escalation.

Many space-based technologies are dual-use, capable of both civilian and military applications, which complicates verification and makes it difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive postures.

Maintaining a balance between advanced defence capabilities and diplomacy is crucial. Cooperative governance, multilateral agreements, and confidence-building measures are necessary to ensure that space remains secure and sustainable. This includes agreements on debris mitigation, deployment transparency, and clear rules of engagement. Failure to integrate these measures could not only undermine national security but also compromise commercial and scientific space activities, creating a feedback loop in which insecurity drives further militarisation.

Initiatives like Golden Dome highlight the tension between technological ambition and collective responsibility: while the system may strengthen US homeland security, it underscores the pressing need for international dialogue and legal frameworks that reconcile national defence priorities with long-term space stability.

Strategic Risks

Arms Race Acceleration: Rivals may expand anti-satellite, hypersonic, and countermeasure programmes.

Unproven Technology: Orbital interceptors and directed-energy weapons remain experimental.

Escalating Costs: Budgets may exceed initial projections, straining resources.

Integration Risks: Multi-layered systems are vulnerable to delays, miscalculation, or failure.

Governance Gap: Militarisation without clear rules threatens norms, legal stability, and international trust.

Orbital Debris: Testing and deployment could endanger satellites and civilian infrastructure.

Ambition vs. Reality

Golden Dome represents a bold leap in missile defence. Its layered architecture and orbital interceptors highlight US technological ambition, but technical, operational, and financial realities remain formidable.

The system's ripple effects on deterrence, arms control, and space militarisation cannot be ignored. Whether Golden Dome emerges as a credible shield or a catalyst for global instability will depend on development outcomes, strategic choices, and the willingness of states to pursue cooperative governance in space. The initiative highlights the tension between national defence ambitions and the need for international stability in a shared domain.

Scott N. Romaniuk: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. Laszlo Csicsmann: Full Professor and Head of the Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary; Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA)