In the flick, a damaged Soviet submarine has to put into a small New England seaport for repairs. The animosity and fear of the residents ends in friendship and gratitude as one of the Soviet sailors rescues a small child. The rest is kismet.
The movie ends with the repaired sub sailing away, guarded by a phalanx of small boats crewed by the townspeople to prevent the U.S. Navy from attacking the Soviet boat. Ah. what halcyon days the Cold War were!
Today, Russia is the "acute" threat after China. That acute has two opposite meanings, one being sharp, shrewd or astute, escaped these U.S. strategy makers. And, despite the million or so dead and wounded, this acute Russian threat has suffered in Ukraine, its army is still posed to assault Western Europe.
That Russia is stiffening defenses on its 1,400-mile border with Finland, a NATO member, is one further example of malicious intent. A small, decrepit hospital being upgraded near the border is Exhibit A. More likely, the hospital is being renovated to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of wounded Russians kept as far out of public view as possible. Yet, who in the West accepts that?
Europe is being coerced by Donald Trump and his team to perhaps double defense spending to 5% of GDP a year. These increases are meant to strengthen NATO and Europe's military power and thus demonstrate to Moscow that its aggression toward the West will not be tolerated.
Unfortunately, three realities raise ugly prospects. First, even if these increases were likely -- and short of a war, they are not -- does the strengthening of one of NATO's alliances increase the overall ability of the alliance to stop a Russian attack of the West? Of course not.
Second, is NATO capable of achieving a coordinated and integrated defense of Europe without assigning individual areas of tactical control to specific nations capable of defending them? The answer is no.
Finally, do the United States and its European allies understand the more imminent and dangerous threat posed by Russia? Again the answer is no. Why?
Rather than conducting an objective analysis of Russia and its military, the worst case is assumed -- or the case that is perceived as worst -- and can be sold politically to win public support. No better example of this is the United States' once closest ally, the United Kingdom.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has called for a "defense dividend" in which spending 2.5% of GDP in 2027 on its military will turn the tide. This spending, it is argued absent analysis, will stimulate the building of military systems that will increase employment and generate economic growth.
In fact, as virtually any senior serving British officer will tell you, the U.K. military of an Army of 70,000 or so, 16 surface combatants and an air force with 140 Typhoon jets will shrink even with this so-called defense increase.
And, this spending will do nothing to address the most dangerous threat. Assuming that no one can win or fight a nuclear war and that it will take five years and probably double that time for the Russian military to recover from the thrashing it is taking in Ukraine -- using the United States as an example after Vietnam -- where then does Vladimir Putin turn? The answer is "active measures," often mischaracterized as "hybrid, asymmetric war or gray zone operations."
Active measures include espionage at an industrial level, infrastructure and cyber attacks, misinformation and disinformation; psychological operations, assassinations and intimidation, and massive propaganda among other tools of the trade straight from the Lenin playbook.
What is being done here and how much of the increases in defense spending affect "active measures?" The answer is that rather than increased spending to defend against the ongoing threat, money will go to defending a threat that at best is far distant.
Can anything be done to recognize this strategic negligence or incompetence? The answer is probably no. This threat cannot be countered with what increased defense spending will buy: more ships, aircraft, combat systems and vehicles that have virtually no value here.
What a pity. And Putin must be thinking how convenient this is for him. He can take his time in reconstituting his force as the United States and its European friends are convinced it is still a potent force. And he can run virtually unchecked in using active measures.
What will we do? Guess?
Harlan Ullman is UPI's Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist; senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council, chairman a private company, and principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. His next book, co-written with General The Lord David Richards, former U.K. chief of defense and due out next year, is Who Thinks Wins: Preventing Strategic Catastrophe. The writer can be reached on X @harlankullman.
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